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Abstract
This paper studies learning under multiple priors by characterizing the decision maker’s
attitude toward information. She is incredulous if she integrates new information with respect
to only those measures that minimizes the likelihood of the new information and credulous
if she uses the maximum likelihood procedure to update her priors. Both updating rules
expose her to dynamic inconsistency. We explore different ways to resolve this problem.
One way consists to assume that the decision maker’s attitude toward information is not
relevant to characterize conditional preferences. In this case, we show that a necessary and
sufficient condition, introduced by [Epstein L. and Schneider M., 2003. Recursive multiple
priors. Journal of Economic Theory 113, 1-31], is the rectangularity of the set of priors.
Another way is to extend optimism or pessimism to a dynamic set-up. A pessimistic (max-
min expected utility) decision maker will be credulous when learning bad news but incredulous
when learning good news. Conversely, an optimistic (max-max expected utility) decision maker
will be credulous when learning good news but incredulous when learning bad news. It allows
max-min (or max-max) expected utility preferences to be dynamically consistent but it violates
consequentialism because conditioning works with respect to counterfactual outcomes. The
implications of our findings when the set of priors is the core of a non-additive measure are
explored.
Key-words: Multiple priors; Learning; Dynamic consistency; Consequentialism; Attitude
toward information
JEL classification: D81, D83
1 Introduction
In decision theory, a current way to model decision making under uncertainty is the Max-min
Expected Utility (MEU) approach, firstly axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The
MEU approach allows to describe Ellsberg-type preferences by assuming that the decision maker’s
beliefs are represented by multiple priors, instead of a single (additive) prior. Because various
economic situations involve information arrivals, an important problem concerns the updating of
MEU preferences when new information comes. Several axiomatically-based responses have been
supplied in the literature.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) axiomatized Bayesian update rules for the case where the set
of prior is the core of a convex capacity. They interpreted the Dempster-Shafer updating as
pessimistic and the Bayes updating as optimistic, depending on which event the worst or the best
outcome would be drawn. Pires (2002) axiomatized the generalized Bayes updating rule for multiple
priors. His key axioms are consequentialism, that is, only those consequences that can be reached
are relevant when conditioning, and a weakening of dynamic consistency. Assuming dynamic
consistency and consequentialism, Wang (2003) axiomatized conditional preferences and obtained
the three rules mentioned above. However, contrary to previous works, he did not assume reduction
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of compound acts, that is, the equivalence between the static and the dynamic representation of
an act.
Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) proposed an updating rule which depends on the unconditional
preference relation. It consists to update such and such subset of the initial set of priors in order
to obtain conditional preferences that are consistent with ex-ante preferences. This allows to
simultaneously keep a weakened version of dynamic consistency and reduction of compound acts.
Whereas conditioning does not depend on counterfactuals outcomes, consequentialism is violated
in the sense that the updating is made with respect to ex-ante preferences.
In many real life situations involving information arrivals, our conditional decisions differ, de-
pending on our attitude toward the information. For instance, on financial markets, investors and
traders can react disproportionately to new information (e.g. annual operating results) about a
given security. Indeed, they can exhibit overconfidence or lake of confidence toward the informa-
tion. Hence we propose to approach the updating of MEU preferences by characterizing the decision
maker’s attitude toward information. When facing new information, she can be incredulous and
only update those priors that give the lower likelihood to the observed event. On the opposite,
she can be credulous and only consider the priors ascribing the higher value to the realized event.
In this case, she will use the maximum likelihood procedure to update her priors. Consequently,
credulity and incredulity can be used to characterize conditional preferences. However, both cred-
ulous and incredulous decision makers are dynamically inconsistent and so they are exposed to
some money pump.
A way to avoid the problem of dynamic inconsistency of credulous and incredulous MEU deci-
sion makers is to assume that credulity or incredulity do not impose any constraint on conditional
preferences. In this case, credulous and incredulous ways of updating give the same conditional
set of probabilities and it is equivalent to apply the Bayes updating rule on each prior, i.e. the
generalized Bayes rule. Our first contribution is to show that the decision maker’s attitude to-
ward information do not affect MEU conditional preferences if and only if the set of priors is
rectangular1, in the sense of Epstein and Schneider (2003). Our result allows to give a behavioral
interpretation of the rectangularity condition. We investigate the implications of this result when
the set of priors is the core of a convex capacity. In this case, according to Sarin and Wakker
(1998)2, the capacity is additive over the first stage of a two-stage filtration. The rectangularity
of the core of the capacity can be seen as the condition under which MEU and Choquet Expected
Utility (CEU) are equivalent in dynamic choice situations.
An other way to avoid the problem of dynamic inconsistency is to mix different character-
izations of the decision maker’s attitude toward information. It consists in assuming that the
decision maker will be incredulous or credulous depending on the nature of the information with
respect to counterfactuals outcomes. We distinguish pessimistic and optimistic decision makers.
An uncertainty-averse decision maker will be credulous when learning bad news but incredulous
when receiving good news. Therefore, such a way of updating can be interpreted as a dynamic
extension of pessimism, understood as ambiguity-aversion. On the opposite, an uncertainty-lover
decision maker will be credulous when learning good news but incredulous when receiving bad
news. Then our second contribution is to propose an updating rule based on attitudes toward
uncertainty that allows preferences to have a recursive structure. From an axiomatic point of
view, dynamic consistency holds but consequentialism is violated, in the sense that the way of
conditioning is depending on counterfactuals outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the set-up and introduces main
notions throughout a motivating example. Section 3 exposes the link between attitudes toward
information and rectangularity. Section 4 presents our approach of the updating based on attitudes
toward uncertainty and section 5 concludes.
1The rectangularity condition allows the MEU criterion to have a recursive structure. The recursive multiple
priors utility model has been applied to real option (Nishimura and Ozaki 2007, Trojanowska and Kort 2007, Miao
and Wang 2007), job search (Nishimura and Ozaki 2004) and portfolio selection (Chen and Epstein 2002, Epstein
and Schneider 2007, Epstein and Schneider 2008).
2Eichberger, Grant and Kelsey (2005) give a partial converse of this result by showing that if the capacity is
convex, then a necessary and sufficient condition to dynamic consistency is that the capacity be additive over the
last stage of the filtration. Dominiak and Lefort (2008) generalize this result to non-necessarily convex capacities.
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2 The set-up and main notions
We consider a discrete and finite time represented by T = {0, 1, 2} and a state space S containing
a finite number of states noted s. An event is a subset of S and for all B ⊂ S we note Bc the
event S\B. The information structure is given by a filtration {Ft}t∈T , where F0 is trivial and for
all t in T we take Ft as an algebra. X is an outcome space, i.e. a subset of R, and we denote
by A ⊆ XS = {f : S → X} the set of acts, or measurable functions. We write fB ≥ fBc if
∀s ∈ B, ∀s′ ∈ Bc, f(s) ≥ f(s′).
A decision maker is characterized by a class of binary relations {<B}B∈F1 on A. When B = S,
we write < the unconditional preference relation. MEU over Savage-style acts with a finite state
space is axiomatized in Alon and Schmeidler (2009)3 and we will assume that < satisfies their
axioms. Then for all f and g in A, f < g if and only if Emin p∈P [u(f)] ≥ Emin p∈P [u(g)], where
P is a (unique, non empty, closed, and convex) set of finitely probability measures on the filtered
measurable space (S, {Ft}t∈T ) and the utility function u : X → R is unique up to a positive affine
transformation. We denote by P10 = {m : F1 → [0; 1]|
∑
B∈F1 m(B) = 1} the set of probabilities
measuring first stage events.
Several rules can be adopted to update P when the right event in F1 is known. Each of them
implies that the class of conditional preferences {<B}B∈F1 is represented by a MEU functional.
Given any first stage event B, the conditional probability obtained from any p in P is noted pB .
The most intuitive updating rule for MEU preferences is the following:
Definition 1 The Generalized Bayes updating rule applied to P conditional on B ∈ F1,min
p∈P
p(B) >
0, gives a set PB of conditional probabilities such that:
PB = {pB |∀A ∈ F2, pB(A) = p(A ∩B)
p(B)
, p ∈ P}
Given any event B ∈ F1, we distinguish the following subsets of P:
QB = {p ∈ P : p ∈ argmax
p∈P
p(B)} and RB = {p ∈ P : p ∈ argmin
p∈P
p(B)}.
Definition 2 The credulous updating rule applied to P conditional on B ∈ F1,min
p∈P
p(B) > 0, gives
a set QBB of conditional probabilities such that:
QBB = {pB |∀A ∈ F2, pB(A) =
p(A ∩B)
p(B)
, p ∈ QB}
This is equivalent to the maximum likelihood procedure. The following example, closed to Kelsey
(1995), shows that a credulous decision maker can be victim of money pumping.
Example 1 Consider a dynamic version of the Ellsberg paradox4. A MEU decision maker is facing
an urn with 30 red balls and 60 blue or green balls. At time 1, a ball is drawn and the decision
maker knows whether this ball is green or not. At time 2, the color of this ball is fully revealed to
the decision maker. The state space is S = {R,B,G} and the information at time 1 is delivered
by F1 = {S,∅, {R,B}, G}. A possible set of priors may be:
P ′ = {p′ = (1
3
, β,
2
3
− β)|β ∈ [ 1
6
;
1
2
]} (1)
Assume that the decision maker initially owns the lottery f ≡ (100, 900, 0) and that the utility
u(.) is linear. Assume that an entrepreneur proposes her to exchange the lottery f to the lottery
g ≡ (1200, 0, 0) for an amount of money, say ε = 100. Because Emin p′∈P′(g − ε) > Emin p′∈P′(f),
she will choose the lottery g − ε rather than f . If event G occurs, the decision maker looses
100. Assume that event (R ∪ B) occurs. If the decision maker is credulous, she overweights the
3Other axiomatizations of MEU preferences in a purely subjective set-up are Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2000)
and Ghirardato et al. (2003).
4Similar extensions of this experience have been proposed by Epstein and Schneider (2003) and Hanany and
Klibanoff (2007).
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information. In this case, she will use the maximum likelihood procedure to update her priors and
only consider those priors that give the higher value to the realized event. Then:
qR∪B(R) =
1
3
max
p∈P
p(R ∪B) =
2
5
(2)
qR∪B(B) =
max
p∈P
p(B)
max
p∈P
p(R ∪B) =
3
5
(3)
and, obviously, qR∪B(G) = 0. Hence the conditional expectations calculated w.r.t. qR∪B are
ErR∪B (f − ε) > ErR∪B (g− ε). Then the decision maker is willing to exchange g− ε for f − ε, and,
given event R ∪B, she will end up with the lottery (0, 800,−100) instead of (100, 900, 0).
The example shows that a credulous decision maker can be victim of money pumping. This
is due to the fact that she is dynamically inconsistent, in the sense that new information arrivals
may generate a reversal between ex-ante and ex-post preferences. This conclusion applies as well
as to incredulous decision makers, i.e. decision makers who are suspicious about the information.
Definition 3 The incredulous updating rule applied to P conditional on B ∈ F1,min
p∈P
p(B) > 0,
gives a set RBB of conditional probabilities such that:
RBB = {pB |∀A ∈ F2, pB(A) =
p(A ∩B)
p(B)
, p ∈ RB}
Because such decision makers will not found event B very credible, they will uniquely update
their priors with regards to the lower envelope of probability priors measuring the realized event.
As noted above, when we characterize the decision maker’s attitude toward information, she
exhibits dynamic inconsistency. Hence a way to avoid dynamic inconsistency is to assume that
the decision maker’s attitudes toward information do not affect conditional preferences: it is the
recursive multiple priors approach.
3 The recursive multiple priors approach
As mentioned in the introduction, Epstein and Schneider (2003) have axiomatized the recursive
multiple priors utility model. “Recursive” means that the following relation holds:
Emin p∈P [u(f)] = Eminm∈P10 [u(f)|F1] (4)
The left member of this equation represents the static evaluation of the act f , whereas the right
member represents its dynamic evaluation. Such a relation is allowed by the following condition
on the structure of P:
Definition 4 P is Ft-rectangular if for all t in T and B in F1,
P = {
∫
S
pB(.)dm|B ∈ F1, pB ∈ PB ,m ∈ P10} (5)
Each p in P is a dynamic coherent risk measure in the sense of Riedel (2004). Given any first stage
event B in F1 and any second stage event A in F2 such that A ⊂ B, the rectangularity condition
can be simply expressed as:
P(A) = {p(A) = pB(A)⊗m(B)|pB ∈ PB ,m ∈ P10} (6)
Example 2 Let us reconsider the previous example. The rectangular set of priors P is such that,
for any q, q′ ∈ P ′ and m in {m = (m(R∪B) = 13 +β,m(G) = 23 −β)|β ∈ [ 16 ; 12 ]}, a generic element
4
p in P is defined by ∀s ∈ S, p(s) = qG(s) ⊗ m(G) + q′R∪B(s) ⊗ m(R ∪ B) and then definition 4
yields:
P = {p = (1
3
m(R ∪B)
1
3 + β
, β
m(R ∪B)
1
3 + β
,
2
3
−m(R ∪B))|β ∈ [ 1
6
;
1
2
],m(R ∪B) ∈ [ 1
2
;
5
6
]} (7)
The set of conditional probabilities PR∪B obtained by the GB rule on P ′ and P are identical:
P(R∪B) = {pR∪B = (
1
3
1
3 + β
,
β
1
3 + β
)|β ∈ [ 1
6
,
1
2
]} (8)
We distinguish the following subsets of P: QR∪B = {p|p ∈ P, p(R) + p(B) = 56} and RR∪B ={p|p ∈ P, p(R) + p(B) = 12}. If the decision maker is credulous, she will update P with the
maximum likelihood procedure and obtain:
QR∪BR∪B =
{
qR∪B |qR∪B(.) = q(.)5
6
, q(R) =
1
3
5
6
1
3 + β
, q(B) = β
5
6
1
3 + β
, β ∈ [ 1
6
;
1
2
]
}
(9)
If she is incredulous, then:
RR∪BR∪B =
{
rR∪B |rR∪B(.) = r(.)1
2
, r(R) =
1
3
1
2
1
3 + β
, r(B) = β
1
2
1
3 + β
, β ∈ [ 1
6
;
1
2
]
}
(10)
It can be readily seen that PR∪B = QR∪BR∪B = RR∪BR∪B , hence the decision maker’s attitude toward
information does not impose any constraint on conditional preferences.
The result is generally stated in the following:
Theorem 1 Let P be a convex, compact and non-empty set of priors on (S, {Ft}t∈T ). Then the
following two statements are equivalent:
i. P is Ft-rectangular as in definition 4;
ii. PB = QBB = RBB.
Proof See Appendix A.1. 
The main implication of this result is that the rectangularity condition does not allow to take
into account different attitudes toward information.
In various uncertain situations dealing with Ellsberg-type preferences, the decision maker’s
beliefs can be represented by a Choquet capacity, i.e. a set function ν : 2S → [0; 1] such that
ν(∅) = 0, ν(S) = 1 and ∀A,B ∈ 2S , A ⊆ B ⇒ ν(A) ≤ ν(B). It is convex if ∀A,B ∈ 2S , ν(A) +
ν(B) ≤ ν(A ∪B) + ν(A ∩B).
In general, P is not characterizable by its lower envelope. However, if there exists a convex
capacity, then it is a lower envelope and it defines P:
P = {p : 2S → [0; 1]|p additive, ν ≤ p ≤ ν¯}
where ν¯ denotes the conjugate capacity such that ∀A ∈ 2S , ν¯(A) = 1−ν(Ac). In this case, P is the
core of ν, noted core(ν), and ν is a lower probability from P. Moreover, the Choquet integral of
utility w.r.t. ν is equivalent to the MEU approach w.r.t. P (Schmeidler, 1986) and the updating
rules defined for P can be used for ν.
Definition 5 The Dempster-Shafer updating rule for ν conditional on B ∈ F1, ν¯(B) > 0, is given
by:
∀A ∈ F2, νB(A) = ν((A ∩B) ∪B
c)− ν(Bc)
1− ν(Bc)
This is equivalent to the maximum likelihood procedure applied to P (Gilboa and Schmeidler
1993). Symmetrically, the second updating rule for ν corresponds to the incredulous updating rule
applied to P (see Chateauneuf et al. 2001).
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Definition 6 The Bayes updating rule for ν conditional on B ∈ F1, ν(B) > 0, is given by:
∀A ∈ F2, νB(A) = ν(A ∩B)
ν(B)
Therefore, it is obvious that these rules can be used to model the CEU decision maker’s attitude
toward information. If she is incredulous, she will use the Bayes updating rule whereas if she is
credulous, she will use the Demspter-Shafer updating rule. The third rule has been developed, for
instance, by Jaffray (1992) and Denneberg (1994).
Definition 7 The Generalized Bayes updating rule for ν conditional on B ∈ F1, ν¯(B) > 05, is
given by:
∀A ∈ F2, νB(A) = ν(A ∩B)1 + ν(A ∩B)− ν(A ∪Bc)
Jaffray (1992) shows that the set of conditional probabilities PB is in general a subset of
core(νB), and further characterizations6of the capacity are needed in order to prove that PB =
core(νB). Note that a sufficient (but not necessary) condition is that core(ν) be rectangular, this
will made clear in proposition 1.
Symmetrically to MEU preferences, a way to avoid the problem of dynamic inconsistency of
CEU decision makers is to assume that core(ν) is rectangular.
Proposition 1 Let ν be a convex capacity on (S, {Ft}t∈T ). Then the following statements are
equivalent:
i. ν defines a Ft-rectangular set of priors as in definition 4;
ii. For all B in F1 s.t. ν(B) > 0, ν¯(B) > 0, and for all A in F2,
νB(A) =
ν(A ∩B) ∪Bc)− ν(Bc)
1− ν(Bc) =
ν(A ∩B)
ν(B)
=
ν(A ∩B)
1 + ν(A ∩B)− ν(A ∪Bc)
iii. ν is additive on F1.
Proof See Appendix A.2. 
It is clear that if core(ν) is Ft-rectangular, then MEU preferences and CEU preferences are
equivalent in dynamic choice situations. Indeed, when both criterion admit a recursive represen-
tation, we should have:
Emin p∈P [u(f)] = Eν [u(f)]
if and only if:
Eminm∈P10 [u(f) |F1] = Eν [u(f)|F1]
4 A Pessimistic approach
Pessimism is usually defined as ambiguity aversion. That is why the question arises of how a
decision maker who always considers the worst case should update her preferences. Our approach
suggests that a pessimistic decision maker will update her priors with regards to the nature of
the information with respect to counterfactuals outcomes. Given any act f in A and any event
B in F1, if the information constitutes good news, i.e. if fB ≥ fBc , she will only update priors
from the subset RB . Indeed, in this case, she minimizes the weight of the information because she
doesn’t find it very credible. In other words, she is incredulous. However, if the event Bc occurs,
then she will use the maximum likelihood procedure to update her priors. Indeed, the information
constitutes a bad new. Therefore, conditional probabilities are given by the updating of QB and
5Such a condition is proved to ensure that the conditional capacity be defined in Denneberg (1994, proposition
2.1)
6Eichberger et al (2009) show that a necessary and sufficient condition to core(νB) = PB is that the capacity be
a generalized version of a convex neo-additive capacity (see Chateauneuf et al. (2007)
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she maximizes the weight of the information. Hence a pessimistic decision maker is credulous when
learning bad news. In the context of non-additive measures, such a definition of pessimism can be
found in Chateauneuf et al. (2001) and is linked to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993).
Definition 8 The pessimistic updating rule applied to P conditional on B ∈ F1 is given by:
∀f ∈ A,
• If fB ≥ fBc , then the updating is incredulous;
• If fB ≤ fBc , then the updating is credulous.
Whereas credulity and incredulity of MEU decision makers expose them to dynamic inconsistency,
pessimism is normatively appealing. Indeed, this allows the criterion to have a recursive represen-
tation.
Theorem 2 Assume that the decision maker is pessimistic. Then, for all f in A and B in F1,
fB ≤ fBc or fB ≥ fBc imply the recursive relation
Emin p∈P [u(f)] = Eminm∈P10 [u(f)|F1] (11)
holds true.
Proof See Appendix B.1. 
On the opposite, we can define the optimistic way of updating corresponding to the max-max
expected utility Emax p∈P [u(.)]:
Definition 9 The optimistic updating rule applied to P conditional on B ∈ F1 is given by: ∀f ∈ A,
• If fB ≥ fBc , then the updating is credulous;
• If fB ≤ fBc , then the updating is incredulous.
Obviously, if the criterion used is the max-max expected utility instead of MEU, the optimistic
rule also allows the recursive relation 11 to be hold. Therefore, in the α-MEU framework7, where
the value of any f in A is given by:
αEmin p∈P [u(f)] + (1− α)Emax p∈P [u(f)]
with α ∈ [0; 1], the pessimistic and the optimistic updating rules correspond to the case where α = 1
and α = 0, respectively. Then both rules can be seen as dynamic extensions of ambiguity-averse
or ambiguity-lover preferences.
It should be noted that, whereas the rectangularity condition allows the recursive relation 11 to
hold on all acts, and not only when information is good or bad news, the pessimistic updating rule
does not. However, contrary to rectangularity, the recursive relation implied by the pessimistic
updating rule is not tied to the filtration. Indeed, our rule can be applied for all B in 2S , and
it is not needed to restrict the domain of events on a given and fixed filtration. It allows to
compare ambiguous situations where uncertainty is differently resolved while preserving a recursive
structure.
Now we define dynamic consistency:
Property 1 (Dynamic consistency) For all B in F1 and f, g in A, f <B g and f <Bc g implies
f < g.
Dynamic consistency avoids money pumps arguments. Because the pessimistic updating rule allows
MEU preferences to have a recursive structure, dynamic consistency is satisfied by a pessimistic
decision maker.
Corollary 1 Assume that the decision maker is pessimistic. Then {<B}B∈F1 satisfies dynamic
consistency.
7α-MEU preferences have been axiomatized by Ghirardato et al. (2004).
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This result can be illustrated in the example 1 if the decision maker uses the incredulous updating
rule instead of the credulous one. Another dynamic property is the following:
Property 2 (Consequentialism) For all B in F1 and f, g in A, fB = gB implies f ∼B g.
Consequentialism is not satisfied, in general, by a pessimistic decision maker, except, obviously, in
the case where P is Ft-rectangular.
Proposition 2 Assume that the decision maker is pessimistic. Then {<B}B∈F1 does not satisfy
consequentialism.
Proof See Appendix B.2. 
Similarly, if the decision maker uses the max-max expected utility criterion, then the optimistic
updating rule implies dynamic consistency but violates consequentialism. In our knowledge, such
a way of updating is the only one to drop consequentialism, understood as the assumption that
counterfactuals outcomes are not relevant to the decision maker. In the CEU framework, an
axiomatically-based pessimistic updating rule has been developed by Chateauneuf et al. (2001).
It consists to use the Bayes updating rule when information brings good news and the Dempster-
Shafer updating rule when information brings bad news. If the capacity is convex, then it is
equivalent to our approach. On the opposite, if the capacity is concave, then it is equivalent to the
optimistic updating. In both cases, the recursive relation
Eν [u(f)] = Eν [u(f)| F1]
holds true when fB ≥ fBc or fB ≤ fBc , but consequentialism is violated.
5 Conclusion
We have studied learning under multiple priors by characterizing the decision maker’s attitude
toward information. We have distinguished credulous and incredulous decision makers. Both of
them exhibit dynamically inconsistent preferences and can be victim of money pumps. Then two
approaches can be adopted to preserve dynamic consistency. First, we assume that attitude toward
information, i.e. the way of updating, does not impose any constraint on conditional preferences.
In this case, the set of priors must be rectangular. Second, when information is good news or bad
news, we suppose that the way of updating is relevant but can vary depending on the counterfac-
tuals outcomes. Then we propose a dynamic extension to pessimism/optimism allowing dynamic
consistency but relaxing consequentialism.
APPENDIX
A Proofs of results of section 3
A.1 Proof of theorem 1
(i) ⇒ (ii). Let P = {∫
S
pB(.)dm|B ∈ F1, pB ∈ PB ,m ∈ P10} be the rectangular set of priors
obtained from an arbitrary (closed, convex and non-empty) set P ′ = {p′|p′ is additive on 2S} of
probability measures. Given any events A ∈ F2 and B ∈ F1 s.t. A ⊂ B, P can be rewritten as:
P(A) = {p(A) = pB(A)⊗m(B)|pB(A) = p
′(A)
p′(B)
, p′ ∈ P ′,m ∈ P10} (12)
Because
pB(A) =
p′(A)
p′(B) ⊗m(B)∑
A⊂B
p′(A)
p′(B) ⊗m(B)
=
p′(A)
p′(B) ⊗m(B)
m(B)
=
p′(A)
p′(B)
(13)
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the GB updating rule applied to P ′ or P generates the same set of conditional probabilities
P ′B = {p′B =
p′(.)
p′(B)
|p′ ∈ P ′} = {pB =
p′(.)m(B))p′(B)
m(B)
|m ∈ P10 , p′ ∈ P ′} = PB (14)
Then the update from p is given by pB =
p′(.)
p′(B) for all m in P10 . Hence for all B ∈ F1 and A ∈ F2 s.t.
A ⊂ B, the application of the maximum likelihood procedure to P implies that each conditional
probability pB(.) in QBB is given by:
pB(A) =
p′(A)
max
m∈P10
m(B)
p′(B)
max
m∈P10
m(B)
=
p′(A)
p′(B)
(15)
Similarly, ∀pB ∈ RBB ,
pB(A) =
p′(A)
min
m∈P10
m(B)
p′(B)
min
m∈P10
m(B)
=
p′(A)
p′(B)
(16)
Therefore,
QBB = RBB = {pB |pB(A) =
p(A ∩B)
p(B)
, A ∈ F2, A ⊂ B, p ∈ P} = PB (17)
(ii)⇒ (i). We have: PB = RBB = QBB . Then, for all p in P, B in F1 and A in F2 such that A ⊂ B,
there exists r in RB and q in QB s.t.:
pB(A) = rB(A) = qB(A) (18)
with pB ∈ PB , rB ∈ RBB and qB ∈ QBB . As r(B) ≤ p(B) ≤ q(B), it follows that r(A) ≤ p(A) ≤ q(A)
and then:
P(A) = {p(A) : r(A) ≤ p(A) ≤ q(A)} (19)
Moreover, rB(A) = pB(A) if and only if r(A) =
p(A)
p(B) ⊗ r(B) and qB(A) = pB(A) if and only if
q(A) = p(A)p(B) ⊗ q(B). Therefore:
P(A) = {p(A)|p(A)
p(B)
⊗ r(B) ≤ p(A) ≤ p(A)
p(B)
⊗ q(B)} (20)
Because r(B) = min
m∈P10
m(B) and q(B) = max
m∈P10
m(B), we have:
P(A) = {p(A)|p(A) = m(B)⊗ pB(A),m ∈ P10} (21)
which can be rewritten as:
P = {
∫
S
pB(.)dm|B ∈ F1, pB ∈ PB ,m ∈ P10} (22)
A.2 Proof of proposition 1
The implications (iii) ⇒ (i) and (iii) ⇒ (ii) are obvious. To see that (i) ⇒ (iii), note that if
core(ν) is Ft-rectangular, then equation 4 becomes:
Eν [u(f)] = Eν [u(f)|F1] (23)
which is equivalent to (iii) (see Sarin and Wakker 1998, theorem 3.1).
Finally, note that (ii) gives:
ν(A)
ν(B)
=
ν(A)
1 + ν(A)− ν(A ∪Bc) (24)
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when A ⊂ B. It implies:
ν(B) = 1 + ν(A)− ν(A ∪Bc) (25)
hence ν(A ∪Bc)− ν(Bc) = 1 + ν(A)− ν(B)− ν(Bc) and then (ii) implies:
1 + ν(A)− ν(B)− ν(Bc)
1− ν(Bc) =
ν(A)
ν(B)
(26)
and if ν is not additive, then there exists ε ∈ R such that:
ν(A)− ε
ν(B)− ε =
ν(A)
ν(B)
(27)
If ν(A) 6= ν(B), then ε = 0 and ν(.) is additive on F1.
B Proofs of results of section 4
B.1 Proof of theorem 2
We successively consider fB ≤ fBc and fB ≥ fBc .
Case 1. fB ≤ fBc . In this case, the decision maker considers QB if B occurs and RBc if Bc
occurs to update her priors. Moreover, we have:
Emin pB∈QBB [u(f)] ≤ Emin pBc∈RBcBc [u(f)] (28)
Let us define conditional probabilities qB and rBc as qB ∈ argmin
pB∈QBB
∫
S
u(f)dpB and rBc ∈ argmin
pBc∈RBcBc
∫
S
u(f)dpBc .
Then inequation 28 implies:
Eminm∈P10 [u(f)|F1] = maxm∈P10
m(B)EqB [u(f)] + min
m∈P10
m(B)ErBc [u(f)] (29)
Therefore, we can define a measure pi such that ∀A ⊂ B, pi(A) = q(A), ∀A ⊂ Bc, pi(A) = r(A) and
pi(B) = max
m∈P10
m(B). We have:
Epi[u(f)] = Eminm∈P10 [u(f)|F1] (30)
Let p∗ ∈ argmin
p∈P
∫
S
u(f)dp. Because fB ≤ fBc , the pessimistic updating rule gives p∗B(.) = p
∗(.)
max
m∈P10
m(B)
and p∗Bc(.) =
p∗(.)
min
m∈P10
m(Bc) and, moreover,
∫
S
u(f)dp∗B ≤
∫
S
u(f)dp∗Bc . It implies:
Ep∗ [u(f)] = max
m∈P10
m(B)Ep∗B [u(f)] + minm∈P10
m(B)Ep∗
Bc
[u(f)] (31)
If p∗B 6∈ argmin
pB∈QBB
∫
S
u(f)dpB and/ or p∗Bc 6∈ argmin
pBc∈RBcBc
∫
S
u(f)dpBc , then
∫
S
u(f)dp∗B >
∫
S
u(f)dqB and/or∫
S
u(f)dp∗Bc >
∫
S
u(f)drBc , hence:
max
m∈P10
m(B)Ep∗B [u(f)] + minm∈P10
m(B)Ep∗
Bc
[u(f)] > Eminm∈P10 [u(f)|F1] (32)
Together with 30 and 31, 32 gives:
Ep∗ [u(f)] > Epi[u(f)] (33)
which is a contradiction. Therefore, Ep∗ [u(f)] = Epi[u(f)] hence pi ∈ argmin
p∈P
∫
S
u(f)dp. It implies:
min
p∈P
∫
S
u(f)dp = min
m∈P10
∫
S
 min
pB∈QBB
∫
S
u(f)dpB , min
pBc∈RBcBc
∫
S
u(f)dpBc
 dm (34)
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which is equivalent to equation 11 when fB ≤ fBc .
Case 2. fB ≥ fBc . In this case, the decision maker considers RB if B occurs and QBc if Bc
occurs to update her priors. Then the method is similar to case 1. We have:
Emin pB∈RBB [u(f)] ≥ Emin pBc∈QBcBc [u(f)] (35)
We define conditional probabilities rB and qBc as rB ∈ argmin
pB∈RBB
∫
S
u(f)dpB and qBc ∈ argmin
pBc∈QBcBc
∫
S
u(f)dpBc .
Therefore:
Eminm∈P10 [u(f)|F1] = minm∈P10
m(B)ErB [u(f)] + max
m∈P10
m(B)EqBc [u(f)] (36)
Therefore, we can define a measure pi such that ∀A ⊂ B, pi(A) = r(A), ∀A ⊂ Bc, pi(A) = q(A) and
pi(B) = min
m∈P10
m(B). We have:
Epi[u(f)] = Eminm∈P10 [u(f)|F1] (37)
Let p∗ ∈ argmin
p∈P
∫
S
u(f)dp. Because fB ≥ fc , the pessimistic updating rule gives p∗B(.) = p
∗(.)
min
m∈P10
m(B)
and p∗Bc(.) =
p∗(.)
max
m∈P10
m(Bc) and, moreover,
∫
S
u(f)dp∗B ≥
∫
S
u(f)dp∗Bc It implies:
Ep∗ [u(f)] = min
m∈P10
m(B)Ep∗B [u(f)] + maxm∈P10
m(B)Ep∗
Bc
[u(f)] (38)
If p∗B 6∈ argmin
pB∈RBB
∫
S
u(f)dpB and/or p∗Bc 6∈ argmin
pBc∈QBcBc
∫
S
u(f)dpBc , then
∫
S
u(f)dp∗B >
∫
S
u(f)drB and/or∫
S
u(f)dp∗Bc >
∫
S
u(f)dqBc , hence equations 37 and 38 imply:
Ep∗ [u(f)] > Epi[u(f)] (39)
which is a contradiction. Therefore, Ep∗ [u(f)] = Epi[u(f)] hence pi ∈ argmin
p∈P
∫
S
u(f)dp. It implies:
min
p∈P
∫
S
u(f)dp = min
m∈P10
∫
S
 min
pB∈RBB
∫
u(f)dpB , min
pBc∈QBcBc
∫
S
u(f)dpBc
 dm (40)
which is equivalent to equation 11 when fB ≥ fBc .
B.2 Proof of proposition 2
Consider acts f and g in A and an event B in F1 such that fB = gB , fB ≥ fBc and gB ≤ gBc . The
conditional MEU of f and g are given, respectively, by Emin pB∈RBB [u(f)] and Emin pB∈QBB [u(g)],
which differ in general.
References
[1] Alon S. and Schmeidler D., 2009. Purely Subjective Maxmin Expected Utility. Tel-
Aviv University.
[2] Casadesus-Masanell R., Klibanoff P. and Ozdenoren E., 2000. Maxmin expected utility
over Savage acts with a set of priors. Journal of Economic Theory 92, 35-65.
[3] Chateauneuf A., Kast R. and Lapied A., 2001. Conditioning Choquet integrals: the
role of comonotony. Theory and decision 51, 367-386.
[4] Chateauneuf A., Eichberger J. and Grant S., 2007. Choice under uncertainty with the
best and worst in mind: Neo-additive capacities. Journal of Economic Theory 137,
538-567.
11
[5] Chen Z. and Epstein L., 2002. Ambiguity, risk and asset returns in continuous time.
Econometrica 70, 1403-1443.
[6] Denneberg D., 1994. Conditioning (Updating) non-additive measures. Annals of Op-
erations Research 52, 21-42.
[7] Eichberger J., Grant S. and Kelsey D., 2005. CEU preferences and dynamic consis-
tency. Mathematical Social Sciences 49, 143-151.
[8] Eichberger J., Grant S. and Kelsey D., 2009. Neo-additive capacities and updating.
Discussion paper 08-31, University of Mahnheim.
[9] Epstein L. and Schneider M., 2003. Recursive multiple priors. Journal of Economic
Theory 113, 1-31.
[10] Epstein L. and Schneider M., 2007. Learning under ambiguity. Review of Economic
Studies 74, 1275-1303.
[11] Epstein L. and Schneider M., 2008. Ambiguity, information quality, and asset pricing.
The Journal of Finance 63, 197-228.
[12] Ghirardato P., Maccheroni F. and Marinacci M., 2004. Differentiating ambiguity and
ambiguity attitude. Journal of Economic Theory 118, 133-173.
[13] Ghirardato P., Maccheroni F., Marinacci M. and Sinischalchi M., 2003. A subjective
spin on roulette wheels. Econometrica 71, 1897-1908.
[14] Gilboa I. and Schmeidler D., 1989. Max-min expected utility with non-unique prior.
Journal of Mathematical Economics 18, 141-153.
[15] Gilboa I. and Schmeidler D., 1993. Updating ambiguous beliefs. Journal of Economic
Theory 59, 33-49.
[16] Hanany E. and Klibanoff P. 2007. Updating preferences with multiple priors. Theo-
retical Economics 2, 261-298.
[17] Jaffray J-Y., 1992. Bayesian updating and beliefs functions. IEEE transactions on
systems, man, and cybernetics 22, 1144-1152.
[18] Kelsey D., 1995. Dutch books arguments and learning in a non-expected utility frame-
work. International Economic Review 36, 187-206.
[19] Miao J. and Wang N., 2007. Investment, Consumption, and Hedging under Incomplete
Markets. NBER Working papers 13250.
[20] Nishimura K. and Ozaki H., 2004. Search and knightian uncertainty. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 119, 299-333.
[21] Nishimura K. and Ozaki H., 2007. Irreversible investment and knightian uncertainty.
Journal of Economic Theory 136, 668-694.
[22] Pires C. P., 2002. A rule for updating ambiguous beliefs. Theory and Decision 53,
137-152.
[23] Sarin R. and Wakker P., 1998. Dynamic choice and nonexpected utility. Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty 17, 87-119.
[24] Schmeidler D., 1986. Integral representation without additivity. Proceedings of the
American Mathematical Society 97, 255-261.
[25] Riedel F., 2004. Dynamic coherent risk measures. Stochastic Processes and their Ap-
plications 112, 185-200.
12
[26] Trojanowska M. and Kort P., 2007. The Worst Case for Real Options. Mimeo, Uni-
versity of Antwerp, Antwerp.
[27] Wang T., 2003. Conditional preferences and updating. Journal of Economic Theory
108, 286-321.
13
